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Our companion article developed a clear conceptual framework of profit sharing between two 
rival firms and studied the effects of this strategy on each firm's profit under the assumption that 
each firm decides unilaterally to give away voluntarily a part of its profit to its rival. This article 
relaxes totally this assumption and allows firms to invest rather a fraction of their profits in a joint 
venture. 
As in the previous article, it shows how and when forming a joint venture may be a successful 
strategy. Furthermore and more importantly, it brings to light that joint venture may be used to 
conceal the profit-sharing (maybe forbidden) strategy. 
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Our companion article developed a clear conceptual framework of pro￿t
sharing between two rival ￿rms and studied the e⁄ects of this strategy on
each ￿rm￿ s pro￿t under the assumption that each ￿rm decides unilaterally
to give away voluntarily a part of its pro￿t to its rival. This article relaxes
totally this assumption and allows ￿rms to invest rather a fraction of their
pro￿ts in a joint venture.
It thus shows how and when forming a joint venture may be a successful
strategy. Furthermore and more importantly, it brings to light that a joint
venture may be used to conceal the pro￿t-sharing (maybe forbidden) strategy.
Keywords: Pro￿t sharing, Oligopoly, Competition, Joint venture.
JEL Classi￿cation: C72, D21, L13, L24.1 Introduction
In a companion paper (Waddle 2005b), we examined how sharing pro￿ts
may increase ￿rms￿pro￿ts in an oligopoly market.
Our companion paper1 focused on such a strategy where both ￿rms uni-
laterally decides to give away a fraction of their pro￿ts to their rivals. The
purpose of this present paper is to relax totally this assumption and to allow
￿rms to invest rather a part of their pro￿ts in a joint venture (henceforth
JV). The rationale of relaxing that hypothesis is to overcome any eventual
prohibition of this strategy.
It thus shed light on how and when forming a JV may be a successful
strategy. Furthermore and more importantly, it brings to light that a JV
may be used to conceal the pro￿t-sharing (maybe forbidden) strategy. Inter-
estingly, this result holds for di⁄erentiated markets too.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model where ￿rms
receive half the JV pro￿t to show the existence of a multiplicity of NEa in
prices. It then points out that ￿rms win by investing in a JV. Section 3
modi￿es the model by allowing ￿rms to share the JV pro￿t according to
a "proportion rule". However, the result remains the same. As before, it
highlights that invest in a JV is a winning strategy. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
We consider here a model similar to the one presented in our companion
paper (Waddle 2005b) except that we allow ￿rms to invest (rather than to
share) a part of their pro￿ts to a joint venture.
Let two ￿rms 1 and 2 in a homogeneous market and suppose that each
￿rm incurs a cost c per unit of production. The market demand function is
q = D(p) = 1 ￿ p. We assume that ￿rms do not have capacity constraints






(pi ￿ c)qi if pi < pj
1
2(pi ￿ c)qi if pi = pj
0 otherwise
i = 1;2 (i 6= j)
where qi is the quantity demanded faced by ￿rm i.
1See Waddle 2005b for a discussion of the relation between our work and the literature.
1Let ￿1 (resp. ￿2) denote the part of the pro￿t that ￿rm 1 (resp. ￿rm
2) is willing to invest in the JV. We assume that ￿i 2 [0;1]. Since ￿1￿1 +
￿2￿2 is invested to the JV, we can suppose that the JV pro￿t function is:
f (￿1￿1;￿2￿2) = ￿ (￿1￿1 + ￿2￿2) where ￿ > 0 is the technology of the JV
production2. Finally, we assume that each ￿rm receives half the JV pro￿t3.
Consequently, we can write the new pro￿t function Pi(pi(￿i;￿j);pj(￿i;￿j))
(hereafter Pi) of each ￿rm as:
Pi = (1 ￿ ￿i)￿i + 1
2f (￿1￿1;￿2￿2) = (1 ￿ ￿i)￿i + 1
2￿ (￿i￿i + ￿j￿j) or
Pi =
￿





We consider a two-stage game whose sequences are thus de￿ned. In the
￿rst stage of the game, ￿rms choose the optimal ￿i to invest. In the second
stage of the game, ￿rms select pi.
In the ￿rst stage of the game, for ￿1 and ￿2 ￿rms simultaneously solve:
Max￿1 P1 =
￿












In the second stage of game, for p1 and p2 ￿rms simultaneously solve:
Maxp1 P1 =
￿












2Note that the joint venture pro￿t function, by analogy to the traditional macro pro-
duction function, can be decreasing, constant or increasing return to scale whether ￿ is
less, equal or greater than 1.
3In the next section, we will relax this assumption by giving out the JV pro￿t following
a "proportion rule": ￿i
￿i+￿j
22.1 Solving the second-stage of the game
To ￿nd the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), we begin by solving
subgames in the second-stage. Recall that, in the second stage, ￿rms are
looking for prices that maximize their pro￿ts.
Proposition 1 If (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿1 + 1
2￿￿2 = 1 and (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿2 + 1
2￿￿1 = 1, then
any prices (p1, p2) such that c ￿ p1 = p2 ￿ pm are NEa in the second stage
of the game
Proof. (p1, p2) such that c ￿ p1 = p2 ￿ pm are NEa if and only if no
￿rm wants to deviate from those prices by ￿xing a price p0
i above or below.
In fact:
c ￿ p1 = p2 = p ￿ pm ) ￿1 = ￿2 ￿ 0
￿1 = 1
2 (p1 ￿ c)(1 ￿ p1) = 1
2 (p ￿ c)(1 ￿ p) = ￿2
P1 =
￿




















(p ￿ c)(1 ￿ p)
Suppose that:









1 ￿ (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿1
￿
(1 ￿ p1)(p1 ￿ c)
If p1 ￿ pm(monopolistic price), then p1 = p ￿ ".
For " very small4, P 0
1 ’
￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿1
￿
(1 ￿ p)(p ￿ c) ￿ P1 ,
￿


















ii) p1 = p2 + " (" > 0) () ￿2 = (1 ￿ p2)(p2 ￿ c) > 0 and ￿1 = 0
4There is no reason for not to suppose that " is very small. For instance, ￿rms need to




















Equations (1) and (2) represent the non-deviation conditions for ￿rms 1
and are both satis￿ed when
￿








Likewise, we can show that ￿rm 2 will not deviate if
￿





2￿￿1 or (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿2 + 1
2￿￿1 = 1.
Conclusion: if (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿1 + 1
2￿￿2 = 1 & (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿2 + 1
2￿￿1 = 1, then
any prices (p1, p2) such that c ￿ p1 = p2 ￿ pm are NEa in the second-stage
of the game.
Proposition 2 If (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿1 + 1
2￿￿2 = 1 or (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿2 + 1
2￿￿1 = 1, then
any prices (pi, pj) such that c ￿ pi = pm < pj are NEa in the second stage
of the game
Proof. (p1, p2) s. t. c ￿ p2 = pm < p1 are NEa if and only if no ￿rm has
interest to deviate from those prices by ￿xing a price p0
i above or below.
A:￿ c ￿ p2 = pm < p1 ) ￿1 = 0 and ￿2 = (p2 ￿ c)(1 ￿ p2) > 0
P1 = 1
2￿￿2￿2 = 1
2￿￿2 (p2 ￿ c)(1 ￿ p2)
P2 =
￿





1 ￿ (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿2
￿
(p2 ￿ c)(1 ￿ p2)
Suppose that:









1 ￿ (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿1
￿
(1 ￿ p2 + ")(p2 ￿ " ￿ c)
For " very small, P 0
1 ’
￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿1
￿
(1 ￿ p2)(p2 ￿ c) < P1 ,
￿









Equation (3) represent the non-deviation conditions for ￿rm 1 and can
be rewritten as: (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿1 + 1
2￿￿2 > 1
4B:￿ c ￿ p1 = pm < p2 ) ￿1 = (p1 ￿ c)(1 ￿ p1) and ￿2 = 0
P1 =
￿





1 ￿ (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿1
￿
(p1 ￿ c)(1 ￿ p1)
P2 = 1
2￿￿1￿1 = 1
2￿￿1 (p1 ￿ c)(1 ￿ p1)
Suppose that:









1 ￿ (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿2
￿
(1 ￿ p1 + ")(p1 ￿ " ￿ c)
For " very small, P 0
1 ’
￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿2
￿
(1 ￿ p1)(p1 ￿ c) < P1 ,
￿









Equation (4) represent the non-deviation conditions for ￿rm 2 and can
be rewritten as: (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿2 + 1
2￿￿1 > 1
Conclusion: if (1￿ 1
2￿)￿2+ 1
2￿￿1 > 1 or (1￿ 1
2￿)￿1+ 1
2￿￿2 > 1, then any
prices (pi, pj) such that c ￿ pi = pm < pj constitute NEa in the second-stage
of the game.
Proposition 3 If (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿2 + 1
2￿￿1 < 1 or (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿1 + 1
2￿￿2 < 1, then
any price (p1, p2) such that p1 = p2 = c is NEa in the second stage of the
game
Proof. (p1, p2) s.t. p1 = p2 = c is NE if and only if no ￿rm has interest
to deviate from those prices to ￿x a price p0
i above or below.
p2 = p2 = c ) ￿1 = 0 and ￿2 = 0
P1 =
￿












We shall study separately the deviation for both ￿rms. Let us check ￿rst
for ￿rm 1. Suppose that:









1 < P1 = 0 )Firm 1 has no interest by ￿xing a price below p2
ii) p1 = p2 + " (p1 > p2 = c) () ￿2 = (1 ￿ p2)(p2 ￿ c) = 0 and ￿1 = 0





1 = 0 = P1 )Firm 1 has no interest by ￿xing a price above p2
Let us check now for ￿rm 2. Suppose that:










2 < P2 = 0 )Firm 2 has no interest by ￿xing a price below p1
ii) p2 = p1 + " (p2 > p1 = c) () ￿1 = (1 ￿ p1)(p1 ￿ c) = 0 and ￿2 = 0





2 = 0 = P2 )Firm 2 has no interest by ￿xing a price above p1
Conclusion: If (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿2 + 1
2￿￿1 < 1 or (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿1 + 1
2￿￿2 < 1, then
any price, (p1, p2) s.t.p1 = p2 = c is a NE in the second-stage of the game.
The second-stage being entirely solved and NEa being found, we can thus
move to the ￿rst-stage of the game in order to ￿nd SPNEa
2.2 Solving the ￿rst-stage of the game
In the ￿rst-stage of the game, ￿rms choose the ￿i optimal maximizing
their pro￿t to share with their rival.
Solving backwards, we have solved the second-stage of the game in the
previous section and have found NEa in prices summarized below5:
i) (p1;p2) = p1 = p2 = c if (1￿ 1
2￿)￿2+ 1




5One can easily check that: if (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿2 + 1










= 3￿￿2 (resp. 1
2
￿








ii) (p1;p2) = c ￿ p1 = p2 ￿ pm if (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿2 + 1
2￿￿1 = 1 & (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿1 +
1
2￿￿2 = 1 with:
￿
P1 = 3￿￿2 (p ￿ c)(1 ￿ p)
P2 = 3￿￿1 (p ￿ c)(1 ￿ p)
iii) (p1;p2) = c ￿ pi = pm < pj if (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿2 + 1
2￿￿1 > 1 or (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿1 +
1
2￿￿2 > 1 with:
￿
Pj = 1










(pm ￿ c)(1 ￿ pm)
Now, in the current section, we draw our attention to the ￿rst-stage of
the game searching for SPNEa in ￿i.
Proposition 4 The strategies (￿1;p1 (￿1;￿2)), (￿1;p1 (￿1;￿2)) s.t.:
i) ￿i 2 ]0;1[ & (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿2 + 1









2 = c if (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿2 + 1





2 = pm if (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿2 + 1
2￿￿1 = 1 and (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿1 + 1
2￿￿2 = 1
c ￿ pi = pm < pj if (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿2 + 1
2￿￿1 > 1 or (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿1 + 1
2￿￿2 > 1
are SPNEa of the game
Proof. The strategies (￿1;p1 (￿1;￿2)), (￿1;p1 (￿1;￿2)) s.t. i) and ii) are
satis￿ed, are SPNEa if and only if no ￿rm has interest to deviate from those
prices by choosing a ￿0
i above or below. Because of the multiplicity of ￿i, we
investigate separately the deviation for each ￿rm.
Let us check ￿rst for ￿rm 1. Suppose that:
i) ￿0
1 < ￿1 ) (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿0
1 + 1
2￿￿2 < 1 )
P
0
1 = 0 < P1 = 3￿￿2 (pm ￿ c)(1 ￿ pm) (5)
ii) ￿0
1 > ￿1 ) (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿0
1 + 1






￿￿2 (pm ￿ c)(1 ￿ pm) < P1 = 3￿￿2 (pm ￿ c)(1 ￿ pm) (6)
(5) and (6) show that ￿rm 1 has no interest to deviate.
7Now, let us check for ￿rm 2. Suppose that:
i) ￿0
2 < ￿2 ) (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿0
2 + 1
2￿￿1 < 1 )
P
0
2 = 0 < P2 = 3￿￿1 (pm ￿ c)(1 ￿ pm) (7)
ii) ￿0
2 > ￿2 ) (1 ￿ 1
2￿)￿0
2 + 1
















(pm ￿ c)(1 ￿ pm) < P2 = 3￿￿1 (pm ￿ c)(1 ￿ pm)
(8)
(7) and (8) show that ￿rm 2 has no interest to deviate.
Conclusion: The strategies (￿1;p1 (￿1;￿2)), (￿1;p1 (￿1;￿2)) s.t. i) and
ii) are satis￿ed, are SPNEa of the game.
3 The modi￿ed model
We consider the same model as in the previous section except that we
allow ￿rms to share the JV pro￿t following a "proportion rule".
As before, let two ￿rms 1 and 2 in a homogeneous market and suppose
that each ￿rm incurs a cost c per unit of production. The market demand
function is q = D(p) = 1￿p. We still assume that ￿rms do not have capacity
constraints and always supply the demand they face. Therefore, the pro￿t





(pi ￿ c)qi if pi < pj
1
2(pi ￿ c)qi if pi = pj
0 otherwise
i = 1;2 (i 6= j)
where qi is the quantity demanded faced by ￿rm i.
Let ￿1 (resp. ￿2) denote the part of the pro￿t that ￿rm 1 (resp. ￿rm
2) is willing to invest to a JV. We assume that ￿i 2 [0;1]. Since ￿1￿1 +
￿2￿2 is invested to the JV, we can suppose that the JV pro￿t function is:
f (￿1￿1;￿2￿2) = ￿ (￿1￿1 + ￿2￿2) where ￿ > 0 is the technology of the
JV production6 Finally, contrary to the last section, we assume that ￿rm
6Note that the joint venture pro￿t function, by analogy to the traditional macro pro-
duction function, can be decreasing, constant or increasing return to scale whether ￿ is
less, equal or greater than 1.
8i receives
￿i
￿i+￿j of the JV pro￿t. For simplicity, let us denote Ci =
￿i
￿i+￿j,
i = 1;2 (i 6= j)
Consequently, we can write the new pro￿t function Pi(pi(￿i;￿j);pj(￿i;￿j))
(hereafter Pi) of each ￿rm as:
Pi = (1￿￿i)￿i+
￿i
￿i+￿jf (￿1￿1;￿2￿2) = (1￿￿i)￿i+
￿i
￿i+￿j￿ (￿i￿i + ￿j￿j)
or
Pi = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ Ci￿)￿i]￿i + Ci￿￿j￿j
We consider a two-stage game whose sequences are thus de￿ned. In the
￿rst stage of the game, ￿rms choose the optimal ￿i to invest. In the second
stage of the game, ￿rms select pi.
In the ￿rst stage of the game, for ￿1 and ￿2 ￿rms simultaneously solve:
Max￿1 P1 = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1]￿1 + ￿C1￿2￿2
Max￿2 P2 = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2]￿2 + ￿C2￿1￿1
In the second stage of game, for p1 and p2 ￿rms simultaneously solve:
Max￿1 P1 = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1]￿1 + ￿C1￿2￿2
Max￿2 P2 = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2]￿2 + ￿C2￿1￿1
3.1 Solving the second-stage of the game
To ￿nd the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), we begin by solving
subgames in the second-stage. Recall that, in the second stage, ￿rms are
looking for prices that maximize their pro￿ts.
Proposition 5 If (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1 + ￿C1￿2 = 1 and (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2 + ￿C2￿1 = 1,
then any prices (p1, p2) such that c ￿ p1 = p2 ￿ pm are NEa in the second
stage of the game
9Proof. (p1, p2) such that c ￿ p1 = p2 ￿ pm are NEa if and only if no
￿rm wants to deviate from those prices by ￿xing a price p0
i above or below.
In fact:
c ￿ p1 = p2 = p ￿ pm ) ￿1 = ￿2 ￿ 0
￿1 = 1
2 (p1 ￿ c)(1 ￿ p1) = 1
2 (p ￿ c)(1 ￿ p) = ￿2
P1 = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1 + ￿C1￿2]￿1
P1 = 1
2 [1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿￿1](p ￿ c)(1 ￿ p)
P2 = 1
2 [1 ￿ ￿2 + ￿￿2](p ￿ c)(1 ￿ p)
Suppose that:
i) p1 = p2 ￿ " (" > 0) () ￿1 = (1 ￿ p1)(p1 ￿ c) and ￿2 = 0
P 0
1 = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1]￿1 = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1](1 ￿ p1)(p1 ￿ c)
If p1 ￿ pm(monopolistic price), then p1 = p ￿ ".
For " very small7, P 0
1 ’ [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1](1 ￿ p)(p ￿ c) ￿ P1 ,
[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1] ￿
1
2
[1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿￿1] (9)
ii) p1 = p2 + " (" > 0) () ￿2 = (1 ￿ p2)(p2 ￿ c) > 0 and ￿1 = 0
P 00




[1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿￿1] (10)
Equations (9) and (10) represent the non-deviation conditions for ￿rms
1 and are both satis￿ed when [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1] = ￿C1￿2 or (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1 +
￿C1￿2 = 1.
Likewise, we can show that ￿rm 2 will not deviate if [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2] =
￿C2￿1 or (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2 + ￿C2￿1 = 1.
Conclusion: if (1￿￿C1)￿1+￿C1￿2 = 1 & (1￿￿C2)￿2+￿C2￿1 = 1, then
any prices (p1, p2) such that c ￿ p1 = p2 ￿ pm are NEa in the second-stage
of the game.
7There is no reason for not to suppose that " is very small. For instance, ￿rms need to
decrease or increase just slightly to get or to lose the entire market.
10Proposition 6 If (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1 + ￿C1￿2 = 1 or (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2 + ￿C2￿1 = 1,
then any prices (pi, pj) such that c ￿ pi = pm < pj are NEa in the second
stage of the game
Proof. (p1, p2) s. t. c ￿ p2 = pm < p1 are NEa if and only if no ￿rm has
interest to deviate from those prices by ￿xing a price p0
i above or below.
A:￿ c ￿ p2 = pm < p1 ) ￿1 = 0 and ￿2 = (p2 ￿ c)(1 ￿ p2) > 0
P1 = ￿C1￿2￿2 = ￿C1￿2 (p2 ￿ c)(1 ￿ p2)
P2 = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2]￿2 = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2](p2 ￿ c)(1 ￿ p2)
Suppose that:
i) p1 = p2 ￿ " (" > 0) () ￿1 = (1 ￿ p1)(p1 ￿ c) and ￿2 = 0
P 0
1 = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1]￿1 = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1](1 ￿ p2 + ")(p2 ￿ " ￿ c)
For " very small, P 0
1 ’ [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1](1 ￿ p2)(p2 ￿ c) < P1 ,
[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1] < ￿C1￿2 (11)
Equation (11) represent the non-deviation conditions for ￿rm 1 and can
be rewritten as: (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1 + ￿C1￿2 > 1
B:￿ c ￿ p1 = pm < p2 ) ￿1 = (p1 ￿ c)(1 ￿ p1) and ￿2 = 0
P1 = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1]￿1 = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1](p1 ￿ c)(1 ￿ p1)
P2 = ￿C2￿1￿1 = ￿C2￿1 (p1 ￿ c)(1 ￿ p1)
Suppose that:
i) p2 = p1 ￿ " (" > 0) () ￿2 = (1 ￿ p2)(p2 ￿ c) and ￿2 = 0
P 0
2 = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2]￿2 = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2](1 ￿ p1 + ")(p1 ￿ " ￿ c)
For " very small, P 0
2 ’ [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2](1 ￿ p1)(p1 ￿ c) < P1 ,
[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2] < ￿C2￿1 (12)
Equation (12) represent the non-deviation conditions for ￿rm 2 and can
be rewritten as: (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2 + 1
2￿￿1 > 1
Conclusion: if (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2 + ￿C2￿1 > 1 or (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1 + ￿C1￿2 > 1,
then any prices (pi, pj) such that c ￿ pi = pm < pj constitute NEa in the
second-stage of the game.
11Proposition 7 If (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2 + ￿C2￿1 < 1 or (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1 + ￿C1￿2 < 1,
then any price (p1, p2) such that p1 = p2 = c is NE in the second stage of the
game
Proof. (p1, p2) s.t. p1 = p2 = c is NE if and only if no ￿rm has interest
to deviate from those prices to ￿x a price p0
i above or below.
p2 = p2 = c ) ￿1 = 0 and ￿2 = 0
P1 = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1]￿1 + ￿C1￿2￿2 = 0
P2 = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2]￿2 + ￿C2￿1￿1 = 0
We shall study separately the deviation for both ￿rms. Let us check ￿rst
for ￿rm 1. Suppose that:
i) p1 = p2 ￿ " (p1 < p2 and p1 < c) ) ￿1 < 0 and ￿2 = 0
P 0
1 = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1]￿1 < 0
) P 0
1 < P1 = 0 )Firm 1 has no interest by ￿xing a price below p2
ii) p1 = p2 + " (p1 > p2 = c) () ￿2 = (1 ￿ p2)(p2 ￿ c) = 0 and ￿1 = 0
(￿rm 1 does not produce)
P 00
1 = ￿C1￿2￿2 = 0
P 00
1 = 0 = P1 )Firm 1 has no interest by ￿xing a price above p2
Let us check now for ￿rm 2. Suppose that:
i) p2 = p1 ￿ " (p2 < p1 and p2 < c) ) ￿2 < 0 and ￿1 = 0 (￿rm 1 does
not produce)
P 0
2 = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2]￿2 < 0
) P 0
2 < P2 = 0 )Firm 2 has no interest by ￿xing a price below p1
ii) p2 = p1 + " (p2 > p1 = c) () ￿1 = (1 ￿ p1)(p1 ￿ c) = 0 and ￿2 = 0
(￿rm 2 does not produce)
P 00
2 = ￿C2￿1￿1 = 0
P 00
2 = 0 = P2 )Firm 2 has no interest by ￿xing a price above p1
12Conclusion: If (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2 + ￿C2￿1 < 1 or (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1 + ￿C1￿2 < 1,
then any price, (p1, p2) s.t.p1 = p2 = c is a NE in the second-stage of the
game.
The second-stage being entirely solved and NEa being found, we can thus
move to the ￿rst-stage of the game in order to ￿nd SPNEa
3.2 Solving the ￿rst-stage of the game
In the ￿rst-stage of the game, ￿rms choose the ￿i optimal maximizing
their pro￿t to share with their rival.
Solving backwards, we have solved the second-stage of the game in the
previous section and have found NEa in prices summarized below8:
i) (p1;p2) = p1 = p2 = c if (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2 + ￿C2￿1 < 1 or (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1 +




ii) (p1;p2) = c ￿ p1 = p2 ￿ pm if (1￿￿C2)￿2+￿C2￿1 = 1 & (1￿￿C1)￿1+
￿C1￿2 = 1 with:
￿
P1 = 2￿￿2 (p ￿ c)(1 ￿ p)
P2 = 2￿￿1 (p ￿ c)(1 ￿ p)
iii) (p1;p2) = c ￿ pi = pm < pj if (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2 + ￿C2￿1 > 1 or (1 ￿
￿C1)￿1 + ￿C1￿2 > 1 with:
￿
Pj = Cj￿￿i (pm ￿ c)(1 ￿ pm)
Pi = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ Ci￿)￿i](pm ￿ c)(1 ￿ pm)
Now, in the current section, we draw our attention to the ￿rst-stage of
the game searching for SPNEa in ￿i.
Proposition 8 The strategies (￿1;p1 (￿1;￿2)), (￿1;p1 (￿1;￿2)) s.t.:







2 = c if (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2 + ￿C2￿1 < 1 or (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1 + ￿C1￿2 < 1
p￿
1 = p￿
2 = pm if (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2 + ￿C2￿1 = 1 & (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1 + ￿C1￿2 < 1
c ￿ pi = pm < pj if (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿2 + ￿C2￿1 > 1 or (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿1 + ￿C1￿2 > 1
8One can easily check that: if (1￿C1￿)￿1+C1￿￿2 = 1 (resp. (1￿C2￿)￿2+C1￿￿1 = 1)
then 1
2 [1 ￿ (1 ￿ C1￿)￿1 + C1￿￿2] = 2￿￿2 (resp. 1
2 [1 ￿ (1 ￿ C2￿)￿2 + C2￿￿1] = 2￿￿1).
13are SPNEa of the game.
Proof. The strategies (￿1;p1 (￿1;￿2)), (￿1;p1 (￿1;￿2)) s.t. i) and ii)
are satis￿ed, are SPNEa of the game.if and only if no ￿rm has interest to
deviate from those prices by choosing a ￿0
i above or below. Because of the
multiplicity of ￿i, we investigate separately the deviation for each ￿rm.
Let us check ￿rst for ￿rm 1. Suppose that:
i) ￿0
1 < ￿1 ) (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿0
1 + ￿C1￿2 < 1 )
P
0
1 = 0 < P1 = 2￿￿2 (pm ￿ c)(1 ￿ pm) (13)
ii) ￿0
1 > ￿1 ) (1 ￿ ￿C1)￿0
1 + ￿C1￿2 > 1 )
P
00
1 = ￿C1￿2 (pm ￿ c)(1 ￿ pm) < P1 = 2￿￿2 (pm ￿ c)(1 ￿ pm) (14)
(13) and (14) show that ￿rm 1 has no interest to deviate.
Now, let us check for ￿rm 2. Suppose that:
i) ￿0
2 < ￿2 ) (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿0
2 + ￿C2￿1 < 1 )
P
0
2 = 0 < P2 = 2￿￿1 (pm ￿ c)(1 ￿ pm) (15)
ii) ￿0
2 > ￿2 ) (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿0
2 + ￿C2￿1 > 1 )
P
00
2 = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿C2)￿
0
2](pm ￿ c)(1 ￿ pm) < P2 = 2￿￿1 (pm ￿ c)(1 ￿ pm)
(16)
(15) and (16) show that ￿rm 2 has no interest to deviate.
Conclusion: The strategies (￿1;p1 (￿1;￿2)), (￿1;p1 (￿1;￿2)) s.t. i) and
ii) are satis￿ed, are SPNEa of the game.
144 Conclusion
This paper has shed light on how two ￿rms in a duopoly market may success-
fully form a joint venture. Furthermore and more importantly, it brings to
light that a joint venture might be used to conceal the pro￿t-sharing (maybe
forbidden) strategy.
Several extensions are readily suggested. The ￿rst and natural one is
the extension of our analysis to more than two ￿rms. The second one is to
consider di⁄erent marginal costs. Finally, the third one is to move from the
homogeneous market to an heterogeneous market. Such extensions should
be straightforward. However, we leave them for future reasearch
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